9 - 1 1 R e s e a r c h

an attempt to uncover the truth about September 11th 2001
mirror of “NERDCITIES/GUARDIAN” site : disclaimer

4.1 Design and Construction Features

WTC 4, 5, and 6 are eight and nine story steel-framed office buildings, located on the north and east sides of the WTC Plaza, that were built circa 1970. The buildings had a range of occupancies, including standard office and retail space. There were underground parking facilities and access to the WTC Concourse, as well as the Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) and New York City subway system.

Because of their close proximity to WTC 1 and WTC 2, all three buildings were subjected to severe debris impact damage when the towers collapsed, as well as the fires that developed from the debris. Most of WTC 4 collapsed when impacted by the exterior column debris from WTC 2; the remaining section had a complete burnout. WTC 5 and WTC 6 were impacted by exterior column debris from WTC 1 that caused large sections of localized collapse and subsequent fires spread throughout most of the buildings. All three buildings also were able to resist progressive collapse, in spite of the extensive local collapses that occurred.

This chapter describes the design and construction features of these buildings and observed damages. Site observations of damage in WTC 5 and WTC 6 were conducted by team members, although access in WTC 6 was severely limited. WTC 4 was declared unsafe, and no access was allowed.

All three buildings were designed by Leslie E. Robertson Associates and had similar design features, although their configurations were somewhat different. Therefore, because most site observations were made in WTC 5, the following discussion focuses primarily on this building, and is assumed to be applicable to all three structures.

4.1.1 Structural Design Features

WTC 5 was located in the northeast corner of the WTC Plaza. The nine-story building was L-shaped in plan, with overall dimensions of 330 feet by 420 feet, providing approximately 120,000 square feet per floor (Figure 4-1). Floors were constructed of 4-inch-thick lightweight concrete fill on metal deck (with a combined thickness of 5-1/2 inches), supported by structural steel framing. The steel floor frame had shear studs welded to the top flange to create a composite floor system with the concrete deck. Wide-flange structural columns were placed on a regular 30-foot-square grid pattern. The floor plates cantilevered out 15 feet from the exterior column lines on all sides. To support this cantilever and provide the basic lateral resistance for the structure, a pair of W27 wide-flange beams were provided at each column line. These doubled wide-flange beams extended between the two outermost column lines, forming a moment-resisting frame, and cantilevered past the outer columns.

Floor beams were typically W16 wide-flange members. At interior column lines, a column-tree system was used, in which a 4-foot-long stub was shop-welded to the column on each side, and the floor girder was simply connected, with shear tabs, to the cantilevers (Figure 4-2). Floor 9 and roof level framing was conventional for steel-frame construction and did not include a column-tree system, as illustrated in Figure 4-3.

4.1.2 Fire Protection Features

WTC 5 appeared to have typical combustible contents for an office building, including furnishings, paper, etc. No evidence of any other type of fire load was noted. There appeared to be local concentrations of heavier fire loads, such as file storage, in some areas of the floors that exceeded the average combustible fire load normally associated with office occupancies. A raised sub-floor was present in a portion of the 6th floor, indicative of a computer room or electronic equipment area.

At the time of the September 11 attacks, WTC 5 was equipped with an automatic sprinkler system. The columns had the characteristics of a 3-hour fire resistance rating. The floor assembly (floor and floor beams) had the characteristics of a 2-hour fire resistance rating. Typical fire resistance ratings of roofs of this type are 1-1/2 hours. The exterior non-loadbearing walls did not appear to have a fire resistance rating.

Based on the building plans and on-site observations of WTC 5, the fire protection material for the steel members was a spray-applied mineral fiber applied directly to the steel columns, beams, and girders. Sprayed fiber is a commonly used low-density material.

Figure 4-1 Typical floor plan for WTC 5 (Worthington, Skilling, Helle & Jackson 1968).

Figure 4-2 Typical column-tree system (not to scale).

Figure 4-3 Typical interior bay framing in WTC 5. (A) Floor 9 and roof level. (B) Floors 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.

There was one continuous open escalator from the Concourse level to the 4th floor and one open escalator connected the Plaza level with the mezzanine. Four stairways connected the Plaza level to the 8th floor, and three of those stairways continued up to the 9th floor.

The stairway enclosure core areas were constructed of two layers of 5/8-inch-thick Type-X (fire resistant) gypsum wallboard on both sides of steel studs. The elevator shafts were constructed of HT shaped steel studs and gypsum wallboard and coreboard, which provides a 2-hour fire resistance rating. This type of wall framing permits construction of elevator shafts from the office side of the wall. These core areas are illustrated in Figure 4-4.

4.2 Building Loads and Performance

There was major impact to WTC 4 from the collapse of one or both of the twin towers (most likely WTC 2) that destroyed all but the northern 50 feet of the building. Extensive damage is evident in Figure 4-5.

WTC 5 was damaged by impact and subsequent fires. The impact damage areas in WTC 5 are shown in Figure 4-6. The debris damage caused localized collapses from the roof to the 3rd floor in most of the areas where exterior columns impacted the structure. Ensuing fires that burned unchecked in the building caused a localized collapse from the 9th floor to the 4th floor. Figure 4-7 diagrammatically shows the damaged and collapsed areas of WTC 5 due to impact and fire.

Figure 4-4 Stairway enclosure core locations in WTC 5.

Figure 4-5 Damage to WTC 4.

Figure 4-6 Damage to WTC 5.

Figure 4-7 See http://www.house.gov/science/hot/wtc/wtc-report/WTC_ch4.pdf (Approximate locations of damaged floor areas in WTC 5).

WTC 6 suffered significant impact and fire damage from the collapse of WTC 1, as shown in Figure 4-8. Most of the impact appears to have been in the center of the building, where the damage extended to the ground level. Figures 4-9 and 4-10 illustrate the magnitude of the damage.

4.2.1 Impact Damage to WTC 5

The impact was most severe at the inside corner at the junction of the north-south and east-west portions of the L-shaped building, as well as at a limited region in the west region of the north-south portion.

The debris impact caused partial collapses of the roofs and some floors beneath the points of impact in all three buildings. In WTC 5, it caused partial collapses down to floor 3. The debris impact also ignited fires that spread throughout the building.

Many areas of buckled steel-beam flanges appeared to have been caused by debris impact. There were 3-1/2 inch steel pipe facade supports along the building perimeter, many of which had buckled from taking part of the collapsed floor loads above the pipe supports (see Figure 4-11). In areas that locally collapsed from impact, some of the floor beams separated from the floor deck and others separated at the welded connection.

Figure 4-8 Damage to WTC 6. Note the edge of WTC 5 on the right hand side.

Figure 4-9 Impact damage to WTC 6.

Figure 4-10 Impact damage to the exterior facade of WTC 6.

Significant impact damage to WTC 5 is shown in Figure 4-12. The damage was concentrated on the west side of the building.

4.2.2 Fire Damage

Figure 4-13 shows WTC 5 on fire. The source of ignition has not been identified. It is likely that it was due to flaming debris entering the building from WTC 1 and WTC 2. There was a complete burnout of all combustibles from the 5th floor and above. Some steel beams supporting the roof were deformed due to the heat, as illustrated in Figure 4-14, and some local buckling occurred as well. Roof tar entered the floor through the drains. There is no indication that this roof tar played a major role in the fires. One area below the roof at the 8th floor collapsed onto the 7th floor and then both onto the 6th, and so on, down to the 4th floor.

The structural damage due to the fires closely resembled that commonly observed in test assemblies exposed to the ASTM E119 Standard Fire Test. After testing, the deformed shapes of beams, girders, and columns are similar to the structural damage that occurred in these buildings. The damage also resembled the fire damage associated with the fire incident at the unsprinklered One Meridan Plaza, a steel-framed building in Philadelphia, and damage observed at experiments conducted at Cardington by the Building Research Establishment (BRE) and British Steel in 1995. These fires are discussed in greater detail in Appendix A, Section A.3.1.3.

Discrete sections of the steel framing were warped or twisted. There was no evidence of weakened connections in the areas of the building that were inspected. Some studs were missing and others were still in place in some areas, even in floor sections that had collapsed. In many deformed beams, there was no evidence of damage at openings cut into the beams, suggesting that web penetration reinforcement design worked as intended, although some localized buckling in beams and girders was observed throughout the burned-out regions.

There was significant fire damage on floors 4 through 8. On some floors, the interior had been completely gutted by fire; on others, the fire damage was severe, but there was still evidence of office partition frames and other light-gauge metal products, except for the 6th floor, which suffered near complete destruction. Even the mid-height partitions were destroyed and had collapsed throughout much of the 6th floor. This level of damage was not evident on the other floors.

Figure 4-11 WTC 5 facade damage.

The sprinkler system appears not to have operated at all. This was evident due to the lack of water damage throughout, but especially in the lower level bookstore shown in Figure 4-15. Many sprinkler heads were damaged; some even melted and fell off the sprinkler piping in the fire areas.

As illustrated in Figure 4-16, the interior of the exit stair tower at the southwest corner was practically untouched by the fire. There were no burn marks or smoke damage in this exit tower, or on the "safe" or stairwell side of the fire door. At one location, a piece of paper was found taped to the exit stairwall just inside the fire door with no evidence of smoke or charring from fire.

4.3 Analysis of Building Performance

4.3.1 Steel and Frame Behavior

The punctures in the building envelope of WTC 5, caused by falling debris from the WTC towers, are a result that would be expected from large debris falling over a great distance. Generally, the debris punched through the roof and floor slabs and severed or otherwise damaged framing until sufficient energy had dissipated to arrest the collapse.

The debris from the towers caused damage to the outside wall steel framing of WTC 5, but this damage did not cause any additional collapse of the floors. In fact, the steel pipe facade supports (mullions) provided structural redundancy to the floor framing and redistributed some portion of the cantilevered floors to other levels.

As illustrated in Figure 4-17, there was local buckling of interior columns. This buckling was most likely due to a combination of fire-induced reductions in strength and a possible increase in stress due to restrained thermal expansion. A detailed explanation of these issues is presented in Appendix A, Section A.3.1.4.

Figure 4-12 Impact damage to WTC 5.

4.3.2 WTC 5 - Local Collapse Mechanisms

Two areas in WTC 5 experienced local collapse under an intact portion of the roof. Although there was debris impact near this area, the symmetrical nature of the collapse strongly suggests that the failures were due to the uncontrolled fires. This is supported by the observation that the columns in this area remained straight and freestanding (see Figure 4-18). This local collapse appeared to have begun at the field connection where beams were connected to shop-fabricated beam stubs and column assemblies as illustrated in Figures 4-19, 4-20, and 4-21.

The structural collapse appeared to be due to a combination of excessive shear loads on bolted connections and unanticipated tensile forces resulting from catenary sagging of the beams. The existence of high shear loads, likely due to collapsing floor loads from above, was evident in many of the column-tree beam stub cantilevers that formed diagonal tension field mechanisms in the cantilever webs and plastic moments at the column, as seen in Figure 4-18.

Figure 4-13 WTC 5 on fire.

Figure 4-14 Deformed beams in WTC 5.

Figure 4-15 Unburned bookstore in WTC 5.

Figure 4-16 Looking through the door into the undamaged stair tower in WTC 5.

It is apparent that fire weakened the steel, contributing to the large shear-induced deformations observed in several of the cantilever beams. The shear failures observed at connection ends in several of the beam web samples shown in Figure 4-18 are indicative of the tensile forces that developed. The end bearing resistance of the beam web was found to be less than the double shear strength of the high-strength bolts, based on the analysis presented in Appendix B.

Steel framing connection samples were recovered from floors 6, 7, and 8 of WTC 5 with the aid of the New York Department of Design and Construction (DDC) and are described in Figure 4-22. These samples have not been analyzed and are being preserved for future study. The photographs of connection samples in Figure 4-22 indicate that the deformed structure subjected the bolted shear connection to a large tensile force. At 550 degrees Centigrade (1,022 degrees Fahrenheit), the ultimate resistance of the three bolts is about 45 kips. The capacity increases to approximately 90 kips at room temperature. Connection failure likely occurred between these bounds.

Figure 4-17 Buckled beam flange and column on the 8th floor of WTC 5 that was weakened by fire.

Tensile catenary action of floor framing members and their connections has been neither a design requirement nor a design consideration for most buildings. Further study of such mechanisms for member failures in fires should be conducted to determine whether current design parameters are adequate for performance under fire loads.

4.4 Observations and Findings

All three buildings suffered extensive fire and impact damage and significant partial collapse. The condition of the stairways in WTC 5 indicates that, for the duration of this fire, the fire doors and the fire protective covering on the walls performed well. There was, however, damage to the fire side of the painted fire doors, and the damage-free condition on the inside or stairwell side of those same doors indicates the doors performed as specified for the fire condition that WTC 5 experienced. These stairway enclosures were unusual for buildings that have experienced fire because they were not impacted by water from firefighting operations. In addition, the stairway doors were not opened during the fire and remained latched and closed throughout the burnout of the floors. Therefore, general conclusions regarding the effectiveness of this type of stairway construction may not be warranted.

The steel generally behaved as expected given the fire conditions in WTC 5. Many beams developed catenary action as illustrated in Figure 4-14. Some columns buckled, as shown in Figure 4-17. The one exception is the limited internal structural collapse in WTC 5. The fire-induced failure that led to this collapse was unexpected. As in the rest of the building, the steel beams were expected to deflect significantly, yet carry the load. This was not the case where the beam connections failed. The failure most likely occurred during the heating of the structure because the columns remained straight and freestanding after the collapse.

The structural redundancy provided by the exterior wall pipe columns helped to support the cantilevered floors. This was important because it kept the cantilevers from buckling near the columns as might be expected.

Figure 4-18 Internal collapsed area in WTC 5.

Figure 4-19 Internal collapsed area in WTC 5.

The limited structural collapse in WTC 5 due to fire impact as described in Section 4.3.2 appeared to be caused by a combination of excessive shear loads and tensile forces acting on the simple shear connections of the infill beams. The existence of high shear loads was evident in many of the column tree beam stub cantilevers that formed diagonal tension field failure mechanisms in the cantilever webs, as seen in Figure 4-19.

The end bearing resistance of the beam web was less than the double shear strength of the high strength bolts. An increased edge distance might have prevented this collapse by increasing the connections' tensile strength. The failure most likely began on the 8th floor and progressed downward, because the 9th floor did not collapse. The 4th floor and those below remained intact.

The 7th floor framing was shop-coated. In some locations, the paint appeared to be in good condition and not discolored by the fire. Paint usually blisters and chars when heated to temperatures of about 100 degrees Centigrade (212 degrees Fahrenheit). This indicates that the fire protection material remained on the steel during the early phase of the fire and may have fallen off relatively later in the fire as the beams twisted, deflected, and buckled. Additional measures for proper adhesion may be required when applying spray-on fire protection to painted steel.

Figure 4-20 Internal collapsed area in WTC 5.

Figure 4-21 Internal collapsed area in WTC 5 with closeup of connection failure at column tree.

Figure 4-22 Connection samples.

Figure 4-22 Connection samples (continued).

Figure 4-22 Connection samples (continued).

On the lower floors, the steel beams appeared to have heat damage from direct fire impact and there was little or no evidence of shop painting, indicating that fireproofing material was either missing before the fire or delaminated early in the fire exposure.

In general, the buildings responded as expected to the impact loadings. Collapse was often localized, although half of WTC 4 and most of the central part of WTC 6 suffered collapse on all floors. The damage was consistent with the observed impact load.

Reinforced web openings in steel beams performed well, as no damage or local buckling was observed at these locations.

The automatic sprinkler system did not control the fires. Some sprinkler heads fused, but there was no evidence of significant water damage, due to a lack of water. This is consistent with the lack of water damage in the bookstore on the lower level and the complete burnout of the upper floors.

4.5 Recommendations

The scope of this study and the limited time allotted prevented in-depth study of many issues that should be explored before final conclusions are reached. Additional studies of the performance of WTC 4, 5, and 6 during the events of September 11, 2001, and related building performance issues should be conducted. These include the following: should be made to permit prediction of their behavior under overload conditions. This can be accomplished with a combination of thermal transfer modeling, structural finite element modeling (FEM), and full-scale physical testing.

4.6 References

AISC. 2001. Manual of Steel Construction, LRFD, 3rd Edition. Chicago.

ASTM. 2000. Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials. ASTM E119. West Conshohocken, PA.

Smith, Dennis. 2002. Report from Ground Zero: The Story of the Rescue Efforts at the World Trade Center. Viking Press.

Worthington, Skilling, Helle & Jackson. 1968. "The World Trade Center, Northeast Plaza Building." Structural drawings.

Zalosh, R. G. 1995. "Explosion Protection," SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 2nd Edition. Quincy, MA.

 4.1 Design and Construction Features4-1
      4.1.1 Structural Design Features4-1
      4.1.2 Fire Protection Features4-2
 4.2 Building Loads and Performance4-4
      4.2.1 Impact Damage to WTC 54-7
      4.2.2 Fire Damage4-9
 4.3 Analysis of Building Performance4-10
      4.3.1 Steel and Frame Behavior4-10
      4.3.2 WTC 5 - Local Collapse Mechanisms4-15
 4.4 Observations and Findings4-16
 4.5 Recommendations4-21
 4.6 References4-21

 Figure 4-1 Typical floor plan for WTC 5.4-2
 Figure 4-2 Typical column-tree system (not to scale).4-3
 Figure 4-3 Typical interior bay framing in WTC 5.4-3
 Figure 4-4 Stairway enclosure core locations in WTC 5.4-4
 Figure 4-5 Damage to WTC 4.4-5
 Figure 4-6 Damage to WTC 5.4-5
 Figure 4-7 Approximate locations of damaged floor areas of WTC 5.4-6
 Figure 4-8 Damage to WTC 6.4-8
 Figure 4-9 Impact damage to WTC 6.4-8
 Figure 4-10 Impact damage to the exterior facade of WTC 6.4-9
 Figure 4-11 WTC 5 facade damage.4-10
 Figure 4-12 Impact damage to WTC 5.4-11
 Figure 4-13 WTC 5 on fire.4-13
 Figure 4-14 Deformed beams in WTC 5.4-13
 Figure 4-15 Unburned bookstore in WTC 5.4-14
 Figure 4-16 Looking at undamaged stair tower in WTC 5.4-14
 Figure 4-17 Buckled beam flange and column on the 8th floor of WTC 5.4-15
 Figure 4-18 Internal collapsed area in WTC 5.4-16
 Figure 4-19 Internal collapsed area in WTC 5.4-17
 Figure 4-20 Internal collapsed area in WTC 5.4-18
 Figure 4-21 Closeup of connection failure at column tree.4-18
 Figure 4-22 Connection samples.4-19

Click here, for Chapter Four of the FEMA Report as a pdf-document.

mirror of “NERDCITIES/GUARDIAN” site : disclaimer